

3 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : The IG Report on Intelligence Requirements

1. The basic issue raised in the subject report--a stated need to become more selectively stringent in devising intelligence requirements and the priorities assigned to them--is largely a substantive issue of direct concern to the DD/I, DD/S&T, and DD/P. Subject to the views of these three officers, I believe the report's thrust and recommendations are generally constructive. The recommendations are largely procedural, however, and would only partially meet the substantive problems described.

2. I have the following concerns and observations:

a. Unless we move to create orderly and systematic procedures to develop requirements, we will continue to face requests for more funds and personnel cited as necessary to meet the currently unbridled requirements. This in itself is a powerful argument for orderly and systematic procedures.

b. A meaningful, systematic, and dynamic procedure would require managerial action to allocate resources in accordance with the priorities. This would mean taking away from the less important. As the report points out, China has for some years been considered by USIB to be of an importance virtually equal to that of the USSR, yet mere statements to this effect have not been matched by commensurate actions of community managers.

c. Although I agree there is need for a systematic approach to the requirements problem, I am not certain it is either wise or necessary that a Director of Central Intelligence become personally identified as the initiator of severe reductions in the number or extensiveness of intelligence requirements. The report cites obvious absurdities (e.g., Somalia-Eritrea) in

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our listings of priority requirements, but to center our needs essentially on survival issues plus a few others could place a Director in constant jeopardy of failing to provide for crisis contingencies. The last decade has been marked by crises in hard-to-believe locales like the Congo, Dominican Republic, and Lebanon. There will be others like them in the decades ahead. The time has come, no doubt, to part company from the "Pearl Harbor syndrome" and to be more realistic and less superficial in arranging intelligence coverage. Nevertheless, I would imagine that our needs will continue to be global. It comes hard for me to picture a Director informing the White House, the NSC, the PFIAB, and our Congressional committees that we possess too much information on too many matters and must cut back severely. It seems to me that a great deal of hard work and study of alternatives is required before the Director could consider taking on such a task. The Director's role would best be reserved for taking stands on specific issues involving specific requirements for specific coverage.

d. I agree that it is best to begin the necessary hard work and study within the Agency, but we should guard against a tendency to consider ourselves as the sole fount of wisdom concerning intelligence needs and functions. If we go in the direction urged by this report, we must not only identify gaps, state real needs, and develop a meaningful priority system, but we will have to explain, persuade, and gain the commitment of other community members. Among other things, we will need a very active NIPE, concentrating on trade-offs between systems and sources.

e. Adoption of the report's philosophy will require not only the implementation of the recommendations but also an intense and sophisticated indoctrination program for our employees. A new type of atmosphere or milieu will be required. Basic solutions will not be found in organizational or bureaucratic realignments.

f. Adoption of the report will also require new long-range plans for the Agency and U. S. intelligence.

g. The report's charge that the information explosion has degraded our analytical effort is an extremely serious one. I

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have not sensed this to be a problem for key analysts in offices like OCI or ONE. It is certainly true that we have clogged the works of processors like NSA, NPIC, and cable centers. It is also true that analysts and processors face an increasingly difficult task in selecting what they shall report or store. My impression, however, is that the production of finished, national intelligence has improved rather constantly in quality, accuracy, and timeliness. Before concluding that this impression is wrong and that we are on a slippery slope, I would like to see the subject get deeper study.

25X1 3. I am sure that we will know better how to proceed after studying the responses of the three directorates which have been analyzing the report. Needless to say, could join with other components in undertaking further studies or in assisting to implement any of the report's recommendations. The recommendations do not come to grips with the management of a requirements system, which almost certainly needs strong central monitoring and supervision. It seems to me that it is to this problem that we should now turn our attention.

/s/ L. K. White

L. K. White
Executive Director-Comptroller

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